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1 Introduction
We propose a solution to the problem of multiplicity of equilibria in a class of two-
stage games in which players who move at the second stage (receivers) are imperfectly
informed about the actions played by those who move at the first stage (proposers).
The most prominent application of this class of games is multi-lateral vertical con-
tracting. These are games in which one or more upstream firms make private offers
to each of two or more downstream firms. Each contract signed by a downstream
firm affects all downstream firms (contracts generate externalities), but at the time a
downstream firm decides whether or not to accept the offer, it does not know what
offers other firms have received (downstream firms operate under imperfect informa-
tion).1
Other applications of this class of games can be found in the literature of consumer
search; international trade; markets with network effects; markets with intermediaries;
financial and health care markets; and in games of electoral competition.2
These games typically feature multiple Sequential equilibria. Equilibria depend
on how, after observing a deviation, the second movers update their beliefs about
the first movers’actions. Refinements that are useful for signaling games such as
the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987), D1 or universal divinity (Banks and
Sobel, 1987) have no bite in this context, because the lack of information is about
the first movers’actions, not about their type.
The literature has dealt with this multiplicity of equilibria by imposing partic-
ular beliefs off the equilibrium path, selecting equilibria that can be supported by
1See theories by Hart and Tirole (1990); O’Brien and Shaffer (1992); Segal (1999); de Fontenay
and Gans (2005); Caprice (2006); Rey and Tirole (2007); Nocke and Rey (2014); Miklos-Thal and
Shaffer (2016), to cite only a few.
2See Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cuñat (2012), Buehler and Schuett (2014), or Janssen and Shele-
gia (2014) on consumer search; Bernard and Dhingra (2015) on trade; de Fontenay and Gans (2014)
or Hagiu and Halaburda (2014) and Mayzlin and Yoganarasimhan (2012) on network effects; In-
derst and Ottaviani (2012) on markets with intermediaries; Ho (2009) on medical care markets;
Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) on financial markets; Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009) on electoral
competition.
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these beliefs, and discarding all other equilibria. In their seminal paper, McAfee and
Schwartz (1994) propose three possible beliefs to consider: passive beliefs, symmetric
beliefs, and wary beliefs.
Passive beliefs, sometimes called “passive conjectures”(Rey and Tirole, 2007), are
such that a downstream firm that receives an out of equilibrium offer does not update
its beliefs on the offers received by all other players; rather, it believes that all the
other unobserved actions remain as in equilibrium. The selection criterion based on
singling out equilibria that can be supported by such passive beliefs is the one most
frequently used in the literature.3
However, “in many circumstances the ad hoc restriction to passive beliefs may not
be compelling”(Segal and Whinston, 2003). Indeed, while defending the assumption
of passive beliefs in the particular game in which they use it, Rey and Tirole (2007)
concede that assuming passive beliefs “is much less appealing in the case of Bertrand
competition, and indeed in many games of contracting with externalities.”
An alternative criterion to solve the multiplicity problem is to select equilibria that
can be supported by symmetric beliefs. These beliefs are such that a downstream
player who receives an out of equilibrium offer believes that all other downstream
players receive this same offer as well. If the equilibrium offer to each downstream
player i is xi, a downstream player who receives an offer of y 6= xi believes that the
offer to every downstream player is also y.4
A third suggestion is to consider equilibria supported by wary beliefs. These be-
liefs are such that a downstream player who observes a deviation believes that the
upstream player must have deviated to a strategy that is optimal given the action
that the downstream player observes. Despite their greater conceptual merit, unfor-
3See Hart and Tirole, 1990; O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; Rey and
Tirole, 2007; Ho, 2009; Arya and Mittendorf, 2011; Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2013; Caprice and
Rey, 2015; Reisinger and Tarantino, 2015, among many others.
4Symmetric beliefs are used, among others, by Pagnozzi and Piccolo (2011). However, most of
the literature seems to agree with McAfee and Schwartz’s (1994): “[Symmetric] beliefs are not very
compelling.”
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tunately wary beliefs have had scant following in the literature of vertical contracting
(Rey and Vergé, 2004; Avenel, 2012a; Reisinger and Tarantino, 2015). Hagiu and
Hałaburda (2014) apply it in a setup with markets with two-sided network effects.5
The problem common to all these criteria is the lack of a convincing argument
for why only one particular set of beliefs should be admissible off the equilibrium
path. The existence of several alternative choices of specific beliefs that have received
consideration in the literature underscores that none of these beliefs are an obvious
choice for all possible games of imperfect information. Eliminating all equilibria that
rest on different beliefs is not warranted. We argue that passive beliefs, wary beliefs,
or symmetric beliefs, may be plausible in a given particular application, but not in
others. A sharp restriction on the set of admissible beliefs to the exclusion of all others
is often inappropriate. Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001) provide evidence of the
weakness of this approach. Using a laboratory experiment that mimics a vertical
industry structure with an upstream firm and two competing downstream firms, they
find that no specific restriction on beliefs (passive or symmetric beliefs) is consistent
with the data.6
A more cautious or modest approach is to accept that we cannot pin down the
exact beliefs off the equilibrium path, beyond the standard consistency restriction on
beliefs required in a Sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). Any assump-
tion of specific equilibrium beliefs, even a plausible one, is ad hoc and it is diffi cult
to justify as superior to all others.
We solve the multiplicity problem by suggesting that the equilibrium action profile
most likely to emerge is the action profile that can be supported in equilibrium by the
5Passive and wary beliefs are justified by two very different rationales. Passive beliefs consider
deviations from the equilibrium strategy as unintented mover’s mistakes; therefore, receivers should
not revise their beliefs. In contrast, wary beliefs implicitly interpret deviations as mover’s intentional
attempts to leave the equilibrium path. In that case, receivers should revise their beliefs accordingly.
Still, wary beliefs cannot rationalize why in the first instance the mover deviated from the equilibrium
strategy.
6See as well the contracting experiments by Boone, Müller and Suetens (2014), and by Möllers,
Normann and Snyder (2016).
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largest set of different beliefs. In application of Bernoulli’s (1713) and Laplace’s (1820)
“Principle of Insuffi cient Reason,”absent any motivation to consider some equilibrium
beliefs as more likely to emerge than others, we should treat all equilibrium beliefs
as a priori equally probable to emerge.7 If so, the strategy profile and action profile
most likely to be played in equilibrium are the ones that can be sustained by the
largest collection of different equilibrium beliefs. We predict that this action profile
will be the one played in equilibrium.
We do not identify the specific beliefs that support the predicted action profile
in equilibrium: we make a prediction only about players’equilibrium actions. Since
actions (unlike beliefs) are directly observable, our predictions are directly testable.
Our selection criterion provides a “stress test”measure of the robustness of an
equilibrium path of play to changes in the beliefs for which it is sustained. The
criterion explores how likely is it that the particular path of play is still played in
equilibrium if beliefs change, and then selects the equilibrium path of play most likely
to be played in a new equilibrium after the change of beliefs.
If a profile of actions a is played in equilibrium only under some narrowly specific
beliefs (so only one or few equilibria result in playing a), while on the other hand
action profile a′ can be supported regardless of agents’off-path beliefs, or for a wide
array of possible beliefs (so that lots of different equilibria result in playing a′), then
we predict that in equilibrium, players will play according to a′, not a. In Section 2,
we offer a simple example to illustrate our approach.
More generally, to identify the equilibrium actions that are most robust in the
sense that they can be sustained in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs, we
proceed in three steps. First, we define a measure over sets of out of equilibrium
beliefs. In line with the Principle of Insuffi cient Reason, we use the standard Lebesgue
measure. Second, for each strategy profile, we identify the set of beliefs that support
7As defined by Wolfram Mathworld, the Principle of Insuffi cient Reason states that “if we are
ignorant of the ways an event can occur (and therefore have no reason to believe that one way will
occur preferentially compared to another), the event will occur equally likely in any way.”
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this strategy profile in equilibrium. For each action profile, we calculate the measure
of the set of beliefs that support at least one equilibrium strategy profile in which
this action profile is played. Finally, we select the action profile with the largest
set of beliefs that support it as an equilibrium action profile. In any finite game,
our criterion yields a non-empty prediction, a property that selection by passive,
symmetric or wary beliefs fails to meet.
We compare the predictive power of several selection criteria, including selection
by the largest of beliefs, using a laboratory experiment on a vertical multilateral
contracting game.
We find that selection according to the largest set of beliefs has better predictive
power than any of the other selection criteria. Over all treatments, 74% of groups of
agents play some equilibrium, and among these, 94% play the equilibrium selected by
the largest set of supporting beliefs, while only 54% play the equilibrium selected by
passive or wary beliefs and only 46% play the equilibrium supported by symmetric
beliefs. We find strong and significant comparative statics across treatments. These
differences across treatments correspond perfectly with the comparative static pre-
dictions of our selection criterion, and clash with the predictions of each of the other
equilibrium selection criteria.
Our results show that in a multilateral contracting game, our criterion correctly
predicts which action profile is more likely to emerge. An important question concerns
the external robustness of our criterion’s predictions. Our selection criterion was
originally designed to resolve the multiplicity of equilibria in a game of electoral
competition over multiple districts. We tested our predictions for this electoral
competition game in laboratory experiments. The criterion performed reasonably
well in this application, for which it was designed.8 The experiments and results on
vertical contracting that we detail in Section 4 are a first test of the external validity
and robustness of our criterion. Whether our criterion is similarly useful in other
8The experimental design, procedures and data analysis of this electoral competition experiment
are available in the working paper version Eguia, Llorente-Saguer, Morton and Nicolò (2014).
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applications (beyond multi-district electoral competition and multi-lateral vertical
contracting) remains an open question. We conjecture that it will perform better
in cases in which the difference in the size of equilibrium beliefs that support each
equilibrium is very large, and not so well if this difference is very small. Tests across
a wide range of games and applications would best settle this question as to whether
our conjecture holds.
A second central limitation of our study is that we do not demonstrate that in-
dividuals behave in line with the refinement we offer for the reasons for which the
refinement is prescribed. That is, we do not provide a theory of belief formation
underlying our refinement and explain which beliefs players should hold. Our the-
oretical contribution predicts how agents will play, but it does not explain why nor
do we investigate why within our experiment. In any application in which there are
good reasons to assume specific beliefs, researchers should use these beliefs and not
our approach. We recommend using our selection criterion only as a second best, in
applications in which researchers do not have a clear basis on which to theorize how
subjects form out of equilibrium beliefs.
In what follows we first offer a motivating example. We then define our selection
criterion and we present our experiments on vertical contracting. Appendixes A1-A5
contain proofs, additional results, a microfoundation of the experimental parameters,
a discussion of alternative selection criteria, and experimental instructions.
2 A Motivating Example
Consider a simplified vertical contracting game with one supplier and two retailers.
A supplier makes independent offers to each of two retailers {1, 2}. Let i denote
an arbitrary retailer and let −i denote the other retailer. The supplier offers to sell
a product either at an exogenously given high price pH ∈ (15, 20), or a low price
pL = 7. Offers are simultaneously and privately made, so that each retailer observes
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the price offered to her, but not the price the other retailer is offered. Each retailer
chooses an integer amount of units to purchase, which must be between 0 and 3. Let
qi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} be the quantity purchased by retailer i. Retailers sell their units of the
product in the consumer market. The unitary price of the product in the consumer
market is strictly decreasing in the aggregate supply Q = q1 + q2 and is summarized
in the following table:
Quantity Q 1 2 3 4 5 6
Price in the cons. market 21 20 15 14 10 6
Notice that if Q > 5 retailers’profits are negative if they buy any quantity from
the supplier. Assume the supplier’s marginal costs are equal to zero. Let Πprod(pi, qi)
with i ∈ {1, 2} denote the supplier’s profits when she sells qi units at price pi to
retailer i. Then Πprod(pL, 3) > Πprod(pH , 1) > Πprod(pL, 2) > 0.
Because a retailer’s profits depend on the number of units purchased by the other
retailer, contracts between the supplier and one retailer exert an externality on the
other retailer. And since contracts with one retailer are not observed by the other,
each retailer faces uncertainty about the expected payoff of purchasing any positive
number of units from the supplier. Therefore, a retailer’s willingness to purchase
depends on beliefs about the trades executed between the supplier and the other
retailer. It is easy to check that there exist only two symmetric pure Sequential
Equilibria in this game. In one equilibrium the supplier offers pL to both retailers
and each retailer buys 2 units if the price offered is pL and 0 units if the price is pH .
In the other equilibrium the supplier offers pH to both retailers and each retailer buys
1 unit if the price offered is pH and 2 units if the price is pL.
Off-path beliefs are critical to sustain one or the other equilibrium.9 Whether an
equilibrium holds or not hinges on the belief that the other retailer was offered a high
9There are also asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies, but for expositional simplicity here we
focus on the two pure symmetric equilibria.
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price pH , following a deviation. If, following a deviation, the probability assigned to
a high price for the other retailer is low enough, the equilibrium holds. Otherwise, it
fails.
For each retailer i ∈ {1, 2}, let an out of equilibrium belief ωi(pH |p̃i) ∈ [0, 1] be the
probability that i assigns to the event that retailer −i is offered pH , when i receives an
off-equilibrium offer p̃i. The equilibrium with supplier’s strategy (pL, pL) is supported
by beliefs such that, after observing offer p̃i = pH , retailer i chooses not to purchase
any unit, which implies that buying either one or two units10 gives negative profits.
That is, buying one unit is not profitable:
ωi(p
H |p̃i = pH)(21− pH) + (1− ωi(pH |p̃1 = pH))(15− pH) ≤ 0, or (1)
ωi(p
H |p̃1 = pH) ≤
pH − 15
6
,
and buying two units is also not profitable:
ωi(p
H |p̃i = pH)2(20− pH) + (1− ωi(pH |p̃1 = pH))2(14− pH) ≤ 0, or (2)
ωi(p
H |p̃1 = pH) ≤
pH − 14
6
.
Constraint (2) is implied by Constraint (1).
The equilibrium with the pair of offers (pH , pH) is supported by beliefs such that,
observing an off-equilibrium offer p̃i = pL, retailer i chooses to purchase two units
and not three units,11 which implies that
ωi(p
H |p̃i = pL)2(15− 7) + (1− ωi(pH |p̃i = pL))2(14− 7)
≥ ωi(pH |p̃i = pL)3(14− 7) + (1− ωi(pH |p̃i = pL))3(10− 7);
10Since pH > 15, a retailer who observes an off-equilibrium offer pH never buys more than two
units.
11It is easy to check that for a retailer i who observes an off-equilibrium offer p̃i = pL, buying two
units is more profitable than buying one or zero units, irrespectively of her beliefs.
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ωi(p
H |p̃i = pL) ≤ 0.5. (3)
Which prediction is more reliable? Passive beliefs support the equilibrium with
(pL, pL) because in this equilibrium, passive beliefs imply ωi(pH |p̃1 = pH) = 0, but do
not support the equilibrium with (pH , pH) because in this equilibrium passive beliefs
imply ωi(pH |p̃i = pL) = 1.Wary beliefs deliver the same prediction as passive beliefs.
On the other hand, symmetric beliefs do not support the equilibrium with (pL, pL)
because ωi(pH |p̃1 = pH) = 1 but support the equilibrium with (pH , pH) because in this
equilibrium symmetric beliefs imply ωi(pH |p̃i = pL) = 0. Both passive and symmetric
beliefs are extreme beliefs, and they each support a given equilibrium irrespective of
the value of parameter pH .
We argue that the focal equilibrium must depend on the value of parameter pH .
We expect that the equilibrium most likely to be played is the one sustained by
the largest set of beliefs. The equilibrium in which the supplier’s strategy profile
is (pH , pH) is supported in equilibrium only if ωi(pH |p̃i = pL) ∈ [0, 0.5] for both
i ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose that pH = 15.3. The strategy profile (pL, pL) can be supported
as a sequential equilibrium only if a retailer i who observes an off-equilibrium offer
p̃i = p
H is almost sure that the other retailer is still offered pL (and therefore refuses to
buy). In particular, this strategy profile is supported in equilibrium only if ωi(pH |p̃1 =
pH) ∈ [0, 0.05] for both i ∈ {1, 2}. Since [0, 0.5] is a larger interval than [0, 0.05],
we argue that the equilibrium in which the supplier proposes (pH , pH) is a better
prediction given pH = 15.3. Suppose instead that pH = 19.8; the supplier’s strategy
profile (pL, pL) is supported in equilibrium only if ωi(pH |p̃1 = pH) ∈ [0, 0.8] for both
i ∈ {1, 2} : in this case most retailer’s beliefs support an equilibrium with (pL, pL),
and we argue that then the equilibrium in which the supplier proposes (pL, pL) is
more robust.
In the next section we formalize this intuition for a larger class of games.
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3 A New Selection Criterion
Consider a class of finite extensive form games G with one upstream player (proposer),
and two or more downstream players (receivers).12 Let 0 denote the proposer, and let
R denote a set of receivers. The proposer moves first: 0 chooses an action a0 ∈ A0,
where A0 is a finite set of feasible actions for the proposer. For each receiver i ∈ R, let
Πi(A0) denote a partition of A0, and for any a0 ∈ A0, let Πi(a0) denote the element of
partition Πi(A0) that contains a0. We assume that if the proposer chooses action a0,
receiver i observes Πi(a0). At the second and last stage, all receivers take simultaneous
actions in response to the information they have observed. We do not impose any
restrictions or assumptions (beyond finiteness) on the action set of receivers.
For any game Γ ∈ G, let s0 denote a pure strategy for the proposer, sR a receivers’
pure strategy profile, and s = (s0, sR) a pure strategy profile. Let S0, SR and S = S0×
SR be the set of all proposer’s pure strategies, the set of all receivers’strategy profiles,
and the set of all strategy profiles. Since the proposer’s set of pure strategies is the
set of actions available to the proposer, the proposer’s strategy profile and proposer’s
action profile coincide. Let I be an information set in game Γ, after the proposer
moves. Let I be the collection of all information sets, so that |I| denotes the number
of information sets in this collection, and for each I ∈ I, let i(I) be the player who
moves at information set I. For each information set I ∈ I, let a(I) denote an action
taken at I. For each information set I ∈ I and each strategy profile s, let s(I) be the
action taken by i(I) at I according to strategy profile s.
Given any proposer’s action a0, let I(a0) ⊂ I be the collection of all information
sets contained in the branches of the game tree that follow after the proposer plays
a0. Let O(a0) ⊂ I be the collection of every information set I such that mover i(I)
observes that the proposer has not taken action a0. That is, O(a0) represents the
information sets in which for each I ∈ O(a0), receiver i(I) finds herself off-path from
12One can easily generalize the setup to two or more proposers. See the working paper version
Eguia et al. (2014) for details.
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a0. Since the game Γ is finite, the size of O(a0), denoted |O(a0)|, is also finite for
any a0. At each information set I, let beliefs µI be a probability distribution over the
nodes contained in I. Let µ = (µ1, ..., µ|I|) be a list of such beliefs, one per information
set.
A pure Sequential Equilibrium of game Γ is a pair (s, µ) that satisfies sequen-
tial rationality and belief consistency (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; or Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991, for a textbook treatment).
Given any proposer’s action a0 ∈ A0, let a receivers’action profile be a list speci-
fying the action taken by each receiver at each I ∈ I(a0), and let this receivers’action
profile be denoted aa0R . We then refer to the pair a = (a0, a
a0
R ) as an action profile.
Given any Sequential Equilibrium strategy profile s∗ with associated action profile
a∗, beliefs along the path of equilibrium play are pinned down by equilibrium strate-
gies and Bayes rule. Beliefs about the actions of other receivers at information sets
that follow an observed deviation by the proposer are also pinned down by receivers’
equilibrium strategies. There is, however, some indeterminacy in the beliefs held by
receivers about the actions taken by the proposer who is observed to have deviated
from s∗. Each information set I ∈ O(a∗0), corresponds to an element other than Πi(a∗0)
of the partition Πi(A0). For each I ∈ O(a∗0), denote ΠIi this corresponding element of
the partition of A0.
Let ∆I be the set of all probability distributions over the actions in ΠIi and let
ωI ∈ ∆I be a probability distribution over the actions in ΠIi . Set ∆I is the set of
all beliefs that i(I) might hold at I about what the proposer did to make the game
unexpectedly reach information set I. Hereafter, we refer to ωI as the belief by i at
I. The standard “belief” µI over the nodes in information set I can be calculated
directly from the belief ωI .
Let ∆O(a0) =
∏
I∈O(a0)
∆I be the set of all possible belief profiles over the collection
of information sets O(a0), and let ω = (ω1, ..., ω|O(a0)|) ∈ ∆O(a0) be a belief profile,
which specifies beliefs at each information set in O(a0).
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For each equilibrium strategy profile s = (s0, sR), define ∆sO(a0) ⊆ ∆O(a0) as the
set of off-path belief profiles such that a Sequential Equilibrium with strategy profile
s and with belief profile ω exists if and only if ω ∈ ∆sO(a0). Each equilibrium strategy
profile s is associated with one equilibrium action profile a, which specifies the actions
taken along the equilibrium path. Let A be the set of all possible action profiles.
For any action profile a = (a0, a
a0
R ) ∈ A, let Sa = {s ∈ S : s0 = a0 and sR(I) =
aa0R (I) for each I ∈ I(a0)} be the subset of strategy profiles such that according to
any strategy profile in Sa, agents play action profile a along the equilibrium path.
Let ∆aO(a0) =
⋃
s∈Sa
∆sO(a0). Then ∆
a
O(a0) is the set of belief profiles such that a
Sequential Equilibrium in which agents play a and hold belief profile ω exists if and
only if ω ∈ ∆aO(a0).
Let L be the Lebesgue measure over ∆O(a0), where ∆O(a0) is the Cartesian product
of |O(a0)| simplexes and hence is itself a subset of a unit hypercube. Then, L(∆O(a0))
represents the size of the set of belief profiles over the collection of information sets
O(a0), and L(∆aO(a0)) is the size of the subset of these that support action profile a
in a Sequential Equilibrium. The fraction
L(∆aO(a0)
)
L(∆O(a0))
captures the relative size of the
off-path belief profiles that support action profile a in a Sequential Equilibrium, over
all belief profiles. We refer to this size as the “Size of Supporting Beliefs of a”or
SSB(a).
Definition 1 The size of off-path beliefs that support an action profile a in equilib-
rium is SSB(a) =
L(∆aO(a0)
)
L(∆O(a0))
. Equilibrium action profile a∗ has a larger set of support-
ing beliefs than equilibrium action profile â∗ if SSB(a∗) ≥ SSB(â∗). An equilibrium
action profile a∗ has a largest set of supporting beliefs if SSB(a∗) ≥ SSB(a) for any
a ∈ A.
Our criterion allows for the ranking of all the equilibrium action profiles according
to the size of the sets of supporting beliefs, from the action profile with the largest
set of supporting beliefs to the one with the smallest set. Therefore, differently
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from standard selection criteria we are able to compare any pair of action profiles of
equilibria and assess which is the one that is most likely to be played according to
our criterion.13 We can also take a further step, relying on a cardinal interpretation
of our criterion to assess the robustness of the proposed selection, by comparing the
size of the largest set of supporting beliefs and the size of the second largest set in
the ranking. For instance, in our introductory example in Section 2 if pH = 15.3, the
proposer’s action profile of equilibrium (pL, pL) had a size of supporting beliefs equal
to 0.05 while the other proposer’s action profile of equilibrium (pH , pH) had a size of
supporting beliefs equal to 0.5, which is ten times larger than the former one, and
therefore in this game there is a substantial difference between the size of the two
sets.
Notice also, that we predict an equilibrium action profile. We do not specify
the particular equilibrium that supports this equilibrium action profile. We seek to
explain agents’behavior and choices, and an action profile contains a full prediction
over these.
The motivation for this selection criterion is agnostic about beliefs off the equi-
librium path. Selection criteria based on passive, symmetric or wary beliefs assume
that off-path beliefs take a particular form, and discard any equilibria not supported
by these particular beliefs. But the focality of these beliefs to the exclusion of all
others is often diffi cult to justify, as we discussed in the introduction. We take a more
open-minded approach toward off-path beliefs. Following traditional pure game the-
ory, we conjecture that agents may have any beliefs off the equilibrium path. Unable
to predict which off equilibrium beliefs agents hold, we use a uniform prior over all
possible beliefs.
In some applications, we may have a-priori knowledge about which beliefs are
more likely to emerge. In these cases, we can adapt our selection criterion, replacing
13Note that there can be more than one equilibrium action profile with a largest set of beliefs. In
Appendix A1, however, we show that the equilibrium supported by a largest set of beliefs is generally
unique over a collection of perturbed games. Hence, we refer to a∗ as the equilbirium action profile
with the largest set of beliefs.
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the Lebesgue measure by a measure that assigns weights to beliefs according to the
probability distribution that best fits the a-priori knowledge. Passive, wary and
symmetric beliefs can be interpreted as an extreme case of this approach, in which
the measure on beliefs assigns all weight to a specific belief. Absent good a-priori
knowledge over off-path beliefs, the measure to use under the veil of ignorance should
be the Lebesgue measure.
The purpose of any equilibrium refinement or selection criterion is to solve the
problem of multiplicity under a preferred solution concept by imposing additional
restrictions to yield a sharper, ideally unique, prediction. An essential property of a
useful refinement or selection criterion is that the criterion must make a non-empty
selection. Unfortunately, selection by passive or symmetric beliefs fail this basic re-
quirement even for finite games: in some finite games with pure strategy equilibria,
requiring beliefs to be passive, or to be symmetric, eliminates all pure strategy equi-
libria (see Rey and Tirole, 2007, for lack of existence of pure equilibria with passive
beliefs).14 In fact, in applications with capacity constraints, passive or symmetric
beliefs are untenable, as they would imply a belief in non-feasible actions (see Avenel,
2012a and 2012b).
In contrast, given a non-empty set of pure equilibria in a finite game, our selection
criterion always relies on feasible beliefs, and it always makes a non-empty selection.
Proposition 1 Given any game Γ ∈ G with a pure Sequential equilibrium, there
exists an equilibrium action profile with the largest set of supporting beliefs.
Selecting the equilibrium action profile supported by the largest set of beliefs
guarantees that we have a well-defined prediction, while selecting using passive or
symmetric beliefs does not.
14For lack of existence with symmetric beliefs, consider a game in which the proposer privately
makes an offer A or B to each of two receivers, and receivers accept or reject. Let the proposer’s
preferred outcome be that one receiver accepts A and the other B, the second best that both accept
A, and the third best that both offers be rejected; and let receivers’preferred outcome be to both
accept A, the second best to both accept B, and the third best to both reject their offers. The only
pure equilibrium is for both to accept A, and it is not sustained by symmetric beliefs.
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In addition to existence of a non-empty prediction, sharpness is a desirable prop-
erty of a selection criterion. In most games, selection by the size of supporting beliefs
yields a unique prediction; the subset of equilibrium action profiles with a largest
set of supporting beliefs is a singleton. An exception are games in which two or
more equilibrium action profiles are supported by all off-path beliefs: in this class
of games, all the equilibria that are supported by any beliefs appear to be equally
compelling, and they are both selected according to passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs,
wary beliefs, the largest set of beliefs, or any other belief-based notion: there is no
belief-based reason to favor an equilibrium action profile over the other. However, in
a vast collection of games, each equilibrium holds for some beliefs and not for others.
Within this class of games, selection by the largest set of beliefs obtains uniqueness
generically (while selection using passive or symmetric beliefs does not attain generic
uniqueness). We formalize and prove this claim in Appendix A1.
We also note that our selection criterion is robust (i.e. delivers an invariant predic-
tion) if we relabel agents or actions, and it is also invariant to affi ne transformations
of the payoff matrix. Being a refinement of Sequential Equilibrium, our selection
criterion is sensitive to changes in the extensive form tree resulting from the addition
of strategically superfluous moves, the elimination of dominated strategies, or the
addition of cloned (payoff-equivalent) strategies.
Having established that our selection criterion better satisfies desirable theoretical
properties (existence and uniqueness), in the next section we test how its predictive
power compares to that of other alternatives in the main application of interest.
4 Experimental Evidence
4.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
We use controlled laboratory experiments to evaluate the predictive power of the
different selection criteria. We implemented two different treatments, denoted by
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treatment L and treatment H, which constitute a variation of the motivating example
presented in Section 2. Unlike in the motivating example, the games implemented in
each treatment allow for only two pure equilibrium profiles.
All participants were given the role of either a supplier or a retailer, and kept that
role throughout the experiment. In each period, suppliers made independent offers
to each of two retailers. An offer took the form of one of two prices: a low price pL
or a high price pH . Because we preferred a more parsimonious game, we constrained
the strategy set of retailers. If they were offered pH , retailers could buy either zero
or one units; and if the price was pL, they could purchase either zero, two or three
units. Suppliers’payoffs were kept fixed across treatments, while retailers’payoffs
varied across treatments. These payoffs are summarized in tables 1 and 2. All these
payoffs are expressed in talers, the experimental currency.
Participants played the game for 50 rounds, being re-matched after every round
within matching groups of 12 subjects. After each round, subjects received full feed-
back concerning the actions of all subjects in their subgroup and their payoffs for
that round. To determine payment, the computer randomly selected five periods for
the final payment. The total amount earned in these periods was transformed into
euros through the conversion rate of 0.03 in Treatment L and 0.045 in Treatment H.
In total, subjects earned an average of €12.87, including a show-up fee of €4. Each
experimental session lasted approximately one hour.
Experiments were conducted at the BonnEconLab of the University of Bonn in
March 2013. We ran a total of 6 sessions with 24 subjects each. No subject partici-
pated in more than one session. Therefore, we have six independent observations per
treatment. Students were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004) and the experiment was programmed and conducted with the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
All experimental sessions were organized using the same procedure. Subjects re-
ceived detailed written instructions, which an experimenter read aloud (see Appendix
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Treatment L Quantity bought Treatment H Quantity bought
by the other retailer by the other retailer
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 33 33 33 33 0 28 28 28 28
Quantity 1 40 39 3 2 Quantity 1 79 64 18 4
bought 2 116 44 42 28 bought 2 175 83 55 19
3 64 61 40 25 3 127 85 31 4
Table 1: Retailer’s payoffs. Payoffs depend on prices offered by the proposer, but this is
captured by the different action spaces.
Quantity bought
by the retailer
0 1 2 3
Price Charged High 0 28 − −
by the supplier Low 0 − 20 40
Table 2: Supplier’s payoffs for each transaction.
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A5). Subjects were asked to answer a quiz to check their full understanding of the
experimental design before beginning the experiment. At the end of the experiment,
subjects completed a short survey which we describe in Appendix A4.
Predictions. As we show in Claim 3 in Appendix A2, games in treatments L and
H allow for two pure Sequential Equilibrium action profiles. In the first equilibrium
action profile, the supplier offers pL to both retailers, and each retailer purchases
two units. We refer to this action profile ((pL, pL), (2, 2)) as the L equilibrium action
profile. The strategy profile that sustains this action profile in equilibrium is such
that retailers would not purchase any unit if offered the high price, because they both
mutually fear that the other retailer would still purchase two units at a low price.
The supplier is thus stuck in a low price equilibrium (which gives him lower profits),
being unable to credibly deviate to offer the high price to both retailers.
We denote by H the second equilibrium action profile ((pH , pH), (1, 1)), in which
the supplier offers pH to both retailers, and each retailer purchases one unit. The
strategy profile that sustains action profile H in equilibrium is such that retailers
who observe a deviation to a low price do not believe that the offer is exclusive to
them: they fear the other retailer received it as well, and thus that quantities in the
market will be large, which limits their willingness to purchase to only two units,
thwarting the supplier’s incentive to deviate in the first place.
As we show in Appendices A2 and A3, the predictions by symmetric beliefs,
passive beliefs and proper equilibrium are constant across treatments. Symmetric
predict action profile H while passive beliefs and proper equilibrium predict action
profile L. Unlike the previous selection criteria, the action profile with largest set of
supporting beliefs varies across treatments.
Our selection criterion predicts equilibrium action profile L in Treatment L and
equilibrium action profile H in Treatment H.15
15In Treatment L, the size of the set of beliefs that support action profile L in equilibrium is 0.81,
and the size of the set of beliefs that support H is 0.10. In Treatment H, this size is 0.16 for action
profile L and 0.93 for action profile H.
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4.2 Experimental Results
We organize our discussion of the experimental results by focusing, in turn, on prices,
quantities and goodness of fit. Appendix A4 has additional data on out-of-equilibrium
beliefs.
4.2.1 Prices
Figure 1 plots the aggregate prices offered by suppliers in both treatments, aggregated
by groups of five periods. Each bar is divided into three tones of gray: the dark gray
part represents the frequency of suppliers who offered both retailers the high price,
the medium gray part represents the frequency of suppliers who offered a high price
for one retailer and a low price for the other, and the light gray part represents the
frequency of suppliers who offered the low price to both retailers.
The figure makes two points quite clearly. First, there is a stark contrast between
the pricing strategies used in both treatments: although in Treatment L prices are
high only in 12% of the cases, in Treatment H they are high in 72.21% of the cases.
This difference is clearly significant (Mann-Whitney test, z = 2.882, p = 0.0039).16
This difference across treatments is in line with the prediction of the largest set of
beliefs but not by the competing selection criteria. Second, although this difference
is evident from the first periods, it increases over time due to opposite convergence
processes. In the last five periods, the percentage of high prices in Treatment L is as
low as 8.33%, while in Treatment H is as high as 91.67%.
Table 3 presents a general evaluation of our predictions in a three-level (overall,
matching group, and subject levels) mixed-effects ordered logistic regression of the
amount of high prices set by suppliers as a function of treatment and the period
number, and both interacted.17 Table 3 indicates the strong treatment effect found
16In all nonparametric tests we used a matching group as an independent observation, because
from period 2 onwards, individual choices were affected by observing other group members. Unless
otherwise noted, we aggregated the data across all periods in a matching group.
17We ran an ordered logit regression since the number of high prices is discrete (0, 1 or 2) and
they are ordered. A linear probability and multinomial logit model yield similar results.
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Figure 1: Aggregate prices in both treatments, aggregated by groups of five periods.
Coef. Std. Err. Odds Ratio z Pr > |z|
Treatment L -1.66 0.58 0.19 -2.86 0.00
Period 0.07 0.01 1.07 13.57 0.00
Treatment L * Period -0.10 0.01 0.90 -12.58 0.00
Cut 1 -0.39 0.40 -0.96 0.34
Cut 2 0.95 0.40 2.35 0.02
Group variance 0.49 0.38
Subject variance 1.52 0.44
Number of Observations 2400
Number of Groups 12
Number of Subjects 48
Log Likelihood -1450.58
Wald χ2 255.56
Hausman test χ2 ∗ 0.00
Table 3: Three-level (overall, group, and subject) mixed effects ordered logistic regression
of high prices offered by supplies as a function of treatment, period, and treatment and
period interacted. Treatment L is a dummy variable that takes value one if the treatment is
L and zero otherwise. ∗ The Hausman test is done on a linear mirror version of the model.
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Figure 2: Quantities bought conditional on the price in each treatment.
above and the convergence pattern observed in Figure 1.
4.2.2 Quantities
Figure 2 displays the aggregate quantities bought conditional on the price in each
treatment in groups of five periods. The graphs on the top (bottom) belong to
Treatment L (H). The graphs on the left (right) correspond to situations in which
retailers were offered a high (low) price. Each bar is divided into different tones of
gray which represent the amount bought: dark gray if the retailer bought zero units,
dark/medium for one, light/medium for two and light gray for three.
Figure 2 shows two clear patterns. First, retailers’behavior when receiving a low
price is in line with the predictions of all equilibria and similar across treatments: they
buy two units 89.96% of the time in Treatment L and 91.90% in Treatment H. The
small difference across treatments is not significant (Mann-Whitney test, z = 0.961,
p = 0.3367). Second, there is a substantial difference in retailers’behavior across
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All Data L H
Passive beliefs / Wary beliefs / Proper Eq. 54.10 99.57 10.43
Symmetric beliefs 45.90 00.43 89.56
Largest set of beliefs 94.46 99.57 89.56
Random 50.00 50.00 50.00
% Equilibrium Play 73.92 76.33 71.50
Table 4: Measure of fit of the different selection criteria. "Random" displays a measure
of fit of a randomly picked equilibrium. The data is restricted to the second half of the
experiment.
treatments when receiving a high price. In Treatment L, retailers demand one unit
24.65% of the time. In contrast, this percentage is 93.48% in Treatment H. This
difference in percentages is not surprisingly highly significant (Mann-Whitney test,
z = 2.882, p = 0.0039). As we found with prices, this significant difference across
treatments is in line with the predictions of behavior given by our largest set of beliefs
criterion but not with the predictions from passive, symmetric or wary beliefs criteria.
4.2.3 Goodness of Fit
The main goal of the experimental part of this paper is to evaluate the predictive
power of the different selection criteria described in the previous section. In this
subsection we address this question by comparing a measure of goodness of fit. The
measure of fit that we use is the percentage of observations in which the entire group
behaved as predicted by a given equilibrium conditional on playing an equilibrium.
Table 4 displays the results for the second half of the experiment as well as the
percentage of groups that played an equilibrium action profile.18
Overall, we find that our selection criterion outperforms both the common predic-
tion of passive/wary beliefs and proper equilibrium, as well as the prediction of sym-
18We restrict the measure to the second half of the experiment due to the convergence process
observed in Section 4.2.1. Qualitatively similar results are obtained when considering the whole
sample.
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metric beliefs. While our selection criterion makes the right prediction in 94.46% of
cases, passive/wary beliefs or proper equilibrium make the right prediction in 54.10%
of cases, and symmetric beliefs in 45.90%. These differences are significant (Wilcoxon
test, z = 1.819, p = 0.0690 and z = 2.411, p = 0.0159).
When we disaggregate by the different games, the predictive power of our selection
criterion equalizes the best of the other criteria. Recall that in L, the prediction of
our criterion coincides with the prediction of the equilibrium under passive and wary
beliefs or proper equilibrium, while inH, the prediction of our criterion coincides with
the prediction of the equilibrium under symmetric beliefs. Therefore, our selection
criterion coincides with one of the others in each game by construction. The noticeable
feature is that our criterion matches in each case the best performer of the other
criteria.
5 Discussion
In the absence of a theory that explains how agents form out of equilibrium beliefs,
any “ad hoc”assumption on out of equilibrium beliefs is arbitrary. The out of equi-
librium beliefs held by the players depend on the specific game they play: games with
different characteristics lead to different patterns of beliefs. If we cannot predict with
confidence which beliefs are salient in a given game, we recommend that we consider
all out of equilibrium beliefs as equally likely.
Under a uniform prior over out of equilibrium beliefs, not all equilibrium action
profiles are equally likely to emerge in the equilibrium actually played: those that
require specific beliefs are less likely to be played than action profiles that hold in
equilibrium for a large set of beliefs. The equilibrium action profile that is more likely
to be played is the one which is supported by the largest set of beliefs. We select this
equilibrium action profile.
To compute the size of beliefs that support a strategy profile s in equilibrium, we
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must construct a measure over sets of beliefs. In finite games, we use the standard
Lebesgue measure defined over the set of all possible beliefs at each out of equilibrium
information set that follows an individual deviation.
Our criterion selects the action profile that has the largest set of supporting be-
liefs. The confidence in our prediction is increasing in the ratio of the largest set of
supporting beliefs, over the size of the set of beliefs that sustain other action profiles.
If the largest set is little larger than others, we conjecture that the equilibrium action
profile with the largest set of beliefs may not always be played, but that nevertheless
the frequency of play of each equilibrium action profile that is played will be increas-
ing in the size of beliefs that support it in equilibrium. If our reasoning is correct, we
can construct an order or ranking of equilibrium action profiles from most to least
likely to be played, where each action profile is ranked according to the size of the set
of beliefs that support it in equilibrium.
In an experiment on vertical contracting games, Martin, Normann and Sny-
der (2001) find that no specific restriction on the set of beliefs fits the data. Beyond
this negative finding, it is diffi cult to conduct an equilibrium analysis with their data,
because in their experiment, no group of players plays according to any equilibrium.
Since all their subject groups are out of equilibrium, comparisons of equilibrium se-
lection predictions are problematic.19 Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001) suggest
that subjects’behavior can be explained by a (non-equilibrium) model in which some
subjects hold passive beliefs and others hold symmetric beliefs. Such an explana-
tion lacks predictive power, because ex-ante we don’t know which fraction of subjects
holds each beliefs. Our selection criterion offers a sharp prediction, based solely on
the characteristics of the game and payoffmatrix, and requiring no information about
subjects’beliefs.
Our theory can be directly generalized to larger classes of finite sequential games,
including games with more than two stages or with a more complex information
19Their experiment is aimed at testing different theories of vertical foreclosure, not at testing
different selection criteria.
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structure. Our intuition —select the equilibrium supported by the largest set of beliefs—
also applies to continuous games. While a precise formalization poses some technical
challenges to define a measure of beliefs over a continuous strategy space, a formal
definition that overcomes these challenges is available in the online appendix.
We argue that in applications in which we cannot predict players’out of equilib-
rium beliefs, we should not assume an arbitrarily chosen set of beliefs. Rather, we
should accept that different beliefs might emerge. Our experiments identify one appli-
cation to vertical contracting in which assuming passive, symmetric or wary beliefs is
unwarranted: the predictive power of any of these criteria is not better than selecting
equilibria at random. In contrast, selection by the largest set of beliefs predicts the
right equilibrium in 94% of cases in which an equilibrium is played.
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Appendices
Appendix A1. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Given a finite game, there are only finitely many action profiles,
and thus, only finitely many of them are equilibrium action profiles. Let k be the number
of different action profiles that can be supported in equilibrium. For an arbitrary action
profile a that can be supported in equilibrium, L(∆aO(aP )) and L(∆O(aP )) are well defined,
and thus
L(∆aO(aP )
)
L(∆O(aP ))
and SSB(a) are well defined as well. There are at most k different
values of size SSB, and thus, there exists a maximum among them.
Uniqueness of the prediction
In Section 3 we claim that selection by the largest set of supporting beliefs generically yields
a unique prediction if no more than one equilibrium action profile is supported by every
off-path belief. We provide a formal statement and proof of this claim.
Let G be a game form, which indicates a set of agents N with n = 1 + nR players (one
proposer and nR receivers), a set of feasible strategy profiles S = S1 × ... × Sn of size |S|,
and the timing and information structure of a collection of games in G, without specifying
the payoffs. Let U ∈ R|A|×n define the payoff for each agent, for each possible action profile.
Then Γ = (G,U) ∈ G defines a specific game. For any ε > 0, let Pε(U) be the set of possible
perturbations of U such that the proposer’payoff stays unaltered, and the payoff of each
receiver is altered by no more than ε. Formally, let Ua ∈ Rn denote the payoff vector for
any action profile a ∈ A, and let Uak denote the k − th component of vector Ua. Then,
for any ε ≥ 0, Pε(U) = {U ′ ∈ R|A|×n : |Uak − U ′ak| ≤ ε for any k ∈ {2, ..., nR + 1}, for
any a ∈ A}. Let Pε(Γ) = (G,Pε(U)) be the collection of games with the same set of pure
strategy equilibria as game Γ that can be generated by perturbing game Γ according to
perturbations in Pε(U).
Proposition 2 Assume action profiles a and a′ can be supported by a largest set of beliefs
in game Γ = (G,U) ∈ G and SSB(a) = SSB(a′) ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists ε > 0 such that
the equilibrium action profile with a largest set of supporting beliefs is generically unique
over the class of games Pε(Γ).
Proof. Assume SSB(a) = SSB(a′) ∈ (0, 1) in game Γ = (G,U). That is, in game Γ,
L(∆aO(aP )
)
L(∆O(aP ))
∈ (0, 1). Then there exists ε̄ > 0 such that for any ε ∈ (0, ε̄] and any Ũ ∈ Pε(U),
in game Γ̃ = (G, Ũ) we also find that
L(∆aO(aP )
)
L(∆O(aP ))
∈ (0, 1) and thus SSB(a) ∈ (0, 1). By
an analogous reasoning, in game Γ̃ = (G, Ũ), SSB(a′) ∈ (0, 1). Consider any perturbation
Ũ ∈ Pε(U) and let Ũλ be the family of perturbations such that for any λ, Ũa′′k = Ũλa′′k for
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any agent k and any action a′′ /∈ {a, a}; Ũλak = Ũak − λ; and Ũλa′k = Ũa′k + λ. Then ∆aO(aP )
strictly decreases with λ, and ∆a
′
O(s′P )
strictly increases with λ, while ∆O(aP ) and ∆O(s′P ) do
not depend on λ. Thus, there is at most one value of λ for which
L(∆aO(aP )
)
L(∆O(aP ))
=
L(∆a
′
O(s′
P
)
)
L(∆O(s′
P
))
and
hence SSB(a) = SSB(a′) is a non-generic event in the family of games perturbed by Ũλ.
Appendix A2. Microfoundation of the Experimental Parame-
ters
In this section we present a microfoundation for the games in the experimental section.
This variation of the motivating example presented in Section 2 allows for only two pure
equilibria. The game is adapted from Segal (1999) and Rey and Tirole (2007) (see as well
Hart and Tirole, 1990; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; or Rey and Vergé, 2004, among others).
An upstream firm (supplier) labeled 0, makes independent offers to each of two retailers
{1, 2}. The supplier sells a good. An offer takes the form of a price. Let p1, p2 ∈ {pH , pL}
be the prices offered by the supplier to retailers 1 and 2, where pH ∈ R++ and pL ∈ R++
are an exogenously given high and low price, respectively. The strategy set of the supplier
is S0 = {(pH , pH), (pH , pL), (pL, pH), (pL, pL)}, where the first component indicates the offer
made to retailer 1 and the second the offer made to retailer 2. Offers are simultaneously
and privately made, so that each retailer observes the offer she receives, but not the offer
the other retailer receives. Retailers choose how many units to purchase. Because we prefer
a more parsimonious game, we constrain the strategy set of retailers. If the price is pH ,
we assume that retailers can buy zero or one units; and if the price is pL, zero, two or
three units. Hence the strategy set for each retailer i is Si = {0, 1} × {0, 2, 3}, where each
strategy (siH , siL) ∈ Si corresponds to how much to purchase following a pH offer (first
coordinate) and following a pL offer (second coordinate). A strategy profile is an element
of {pH , pL}2 × ({0, 1} × {0, 2, 3})2 .
The supplier incurs a transaction cost c0 ∈ R+ for each executed trade, and each retailer
incurs a transaction cost cr ∈ R+ if she accepts an offer. Let qi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} be the quantity
purchased by retailer i. Retailers sell their units of the good in the consumer market. The
aggregate supply is Q = q1 + q2. If Q > 0, the price of the good in the consumer market is
a function p : {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} −→ R+ of the aggregate supply Q. We assume function p is
strictly decreasing in Q. Profits for the supplier and retailer i are
∑2
i=1(piqi − c01[qi > 0])
and (p(Q) − pi)qi − cr1[qi > 0] respectively, where 1[·] is the indicator function; if Q = 0
profits are zero for all players.
The game form contains ten parameters. Let θ = (pH , pL, c0, cr, p(1), p(2), p(3), p(4), p(5), p(6))
be a parameter vector. We are interested in parameter values that generate multiple (two)
equilibria in which different selection criteria generate different predictions.
Definition 2 Let Θ be the set of parameter vectors such that θ ∈ Θ if and only if
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i) 3pL > pH > 2pL > c0, and
ii) for each retailer i, the best response correspondences BRi(pi, q−i) are given by the
following table:
Quantity q−i
0 1 2 3
BRi(p
H , q−i) 1 1 0 0
BRi(p
L, q−i) 2 3 2 0
According to the first condition, selling one unit at a high price is better for the supplier
than selling two at a low price, but not as good as selling three at a low price (and any
transaction is better than no transaction). The second condition on retailers’best responses
leads to the existence of two equilibria: one in which both retailers purchase one unit at
price pH , and another in which both retailers purchase two units at price pL. No other
outcome can be sustained in a pure equilibrium.
For any parameter vector θ, let Γθ be the game with the specified game form, and
parameter values θ. Let an action profile sustained in equilibrium (or, simply, an equilibrium
action profile), be the action played by the supplier according to the equilibrium strategy
profile, and the actions played by the retailers along the equilibrium path, that is, in case
the supplier does not deviate from her equilibrium strategy.
Claim 3 For any θ ∈ Θ, the set of action profiles that are sustained in a pure Sequential
Equilibrium of game Γθ is {((pL, pL), 2, 2), ((pH , pH), 1, 1)}.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary θ ∈ Θ and the corresponding game Γθ; we first prove that
there are two pure strategy profiles that are supported in a Sequential Equilibrium of the
game. Consider first strategy profile ((L,L), (0, 2), (0, 2)). For each retailer to buy two units
is the unique best response when the price offered is low and the other retailer is buying two
units. If the supplier deviates by proposing a high price to some retailer, then she decreases
her payoffbecause the retailer buys zero units and the deviation is not observed by the other
retailer. When the price offered is high, to buy zero units is a best response for a retailer
who assigns probability one that the supplier is proposing a low price to the other retailer.
Thus ((L,L), (0, 2), (0, 2)) satisfies sequential rationality. A totally mixed strategy profile
that assigns probability 1 − ε to suppliers’ strategy ((L,L), (0, 2), (0, 2)) and probability
ε
2 − ε
2 to ((L,H), (0, 2), (0, 2)) and ((H,L), (0, 2), (0, 2)) and ε2 to all other strategies
combined, with each of these strategies receiving equal weight, converges as ε −→ 0 to
profile ((L,L), (0, 2), (0, 2)) and the beliefs obtained by Bayesian updating for any ε > 0
converge to the beliefs specified above that a retailer observing an offer of a high price
believes the supplier offers a low price to the other retailer with probability one. Thus the
equilibrium satisfies belief consistency.
Consider the strategy profile ((H,H), (1, 2), (1, 2)). For each retailer to buy one unit
is the unique best response when the price is high and the other retailer is buying one
unit. If the supplier deviates proposing a low price to any retailer, she decreases her payoff
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because the retailer buys two units and by assumption pH > 2pL. To buy two units when
the price offered is low is a best response for a retailer who assigns probability one that
the supplier is proposing a low price to the other retailer, too. Thus ((H,H), (0, 2), (0, 2))
satisfies sequential rationality. A totally mixed strategy profile that assigns probability 1−ε
to suppliers’ strategy ((H,H), (1, 2), (1, 2)) and probability ε − ε2 to ((L,L), (1, 2), (1, 2))
and ε2 to all other strategies combined, with each of these strategies receiving equal weight,
converges as ε −→ 0 to profile ((H,H), (1, 2), (1, 2)) and the beliefs obtained by Bayesian
updating for any ε > 0 converge to the beliefs specified above that a retailer observing
an offer of a low price believes the supplier offers a low price to the other retailer with
probability one. Thus the equilibrium satisfies belief consistency.
Consider now any other strategy profile. First, notice that if the supplier proposes a
high price to retailer i = 1, 2, retailer i buys a positive amount if and only if retailer j 6= i
buys at most one unit. If retailer i buys at most one unit (as he is forced to do if the price
offered to him is high), retailer j′s best response is to buy two or three units when the price
offered to him is low. It follows that if, in equilibrium, the supplier offers a high price to
retailer i and a low price to retailer j, then retailer i buys zero unit, and retailer j buys
two units. However, if the supplier deviates and offers a low price to retailer i, then retailer
i’s best response is to buy a positive amount, irrespective of his beliefs about the price
offered by the supplier to retailer j. Therefore the deviation is profitable for the supplier.
It follows that there are no asymmetric equilibria such that the supplier offers a high price
to a retailer and a low price to the other one. If the supplier offers a high price to both
retailers, to buy one unit is the best response for each retailer irrespective of the amount
that the other retailer buys. If the supplier offers a low price to both retailers, if retailer i
buys three units, retailer j′s best response is to buy zero units. However, to buy three units
for retailer i is not the best response when retailer j buys zero units. Hence, there are no
equilibria such that the supplier offers a low price to both retailers and some retailer buys
a quantity different than two.
The first equilibrium action profile is ((pL, pL), 2, 2), that is, the supplier offers a low
price to both retailers, and each retailer purchases two units. We refer to this action profile
as the L equilibrium action profile. The strategy profile that sustains this action profile
in equilibrium is such that retailers would not purchase any unit if offered the high price,
because they both mutually fear that the other retailer would still purchase two units at
a low price. The supplier is thus stuck in a low price equilibrium (which gives him lower
profits), being unable to credibly deviate to offer the high price to both retailers.
In the second equilibrium action profile, denoted H, prices are high, quantities low. The
supplier could be tempted to deviate by offering a low price to a retailer, who would then
benefit from purchasing three units, which would increase the supplier’s profit. However,
the strategy profile that sustains action profile H in equilibrium is such that retailers who
observe a deviation to a low price do not believe that the offer is exclusive to them: they
fear the other retailer received it as well, and thus that quantities in the market will be
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large, which limits their willingness to purchase to only two units, thwarting the supplier’s
incentive to deviate in the first place.
Claim 4 For any θ ∈ Θ, ((pL, pL), 2, 2) is the unique action profile supported by passive
beliefs in a pure Sequential equilibrium of game Γθ, and is also the unique action profile
supported by wary beliefs; whereas ((pH , pH), 1, 1) is the unique action profile supported by
symmetric beliefs.
Proof. This claim follows immediately from the proof of Claim 3 and the definitions of
passive beliefs, and symmetric beliefs.
The action profile ((pL, pL), 2, 2) is also the unique action profile sustained in a proper
equilibrium (Claim 5 in Appendix A3).
Whether an equilibrium holds or not hinges on the belief that the other retailer was
offered a high price pH . Let ωi(pH |p̃i), be the probability assigned by retailer i with beliefs
ωi to p−i = pH after observing p̃i.
Equilibrium action profile L is supported by beliefs such that, after observing offer
p̃i = p
H , retailer i chooses not to purchase any units, which implies that
ωi(p
H |p̃i = pH)p(1) + (1− ωi(pH |p̃i = pH))p(3)− pH − cr ≤ 0 (4)
ωi(p
H |p̃i = pH) ≤
pH + cr − p(3)
p(1)− p(3) .
Equilibrium action profile H is supported by beliefs such that, observing offer p̃i = pL,
retailer i chooses to purchase two units, and not three, which implies that
2[ωi(p
H |p̃i = pL)p(3) + (1− ωi(pH |p̃i = pL))p(4)− pL]− cr
≥ 3[ωi(pH |p̃i = pL)p(4) + (1− ωi(pH |p̃i = pL))p(5)− pL]− cr
ωi(p
H |p̃i = pL) ≤
pL − 3p(5) + 2p(4)
5p(4)− 2p(3)− 3p(5) . (5)
Let
ΘL =
{
θ ∈ Θ : p
H + cr − p(3)
p(1)− p(3) >
pL − 3p(5) + 2p(4)
5p(4)− 2p(3)− 3p(5)
}
and
ΘH =
{
θ ∈ Θ : p
H + cr − p(3)
p(1)− p(3) <
pL − 3p(5) + 2p(4)
5p(4)− 2p(3)− 3p(5)
}
.
The hyperplane p
H+cr−p(3)
p(1)−p(3) =
pL−3p(5)+2p(4)
5p(4)−2p(3)−3p(5) divides the set of parameter vectors Θ into
two regions denoted by ΘL and ΘH . In the region ΘL a larger set of beliefs sustains the
equilibrium L and in the region ΘH a larger set of beliefs sustains the equilibrium H. Notice
that Θ−(ΘL ∪ΘH) has measure zero; the equilibrium supported by the largest set of beliefs
is generically unique over the set of parameters. We obtain the following prediction:
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Prediction If θ ∈ ΘL, we predict that subjects will play the L equilibrium, if θ ∈ ΘH ,
we predict that subjects will play the H equilibrium, based on the size of the set of beliefs
that support each equilibrium.
The two treatments presented in Section 4.1 use different parameter constellations, with
θL ∈ ΘL in treatment L and θH ∈ ΘH in treatment H. Unlike in the motivating example,
the parameters related to supplier payoffs are kept fixed across the two games: supplier
prices are pH = 36, pL = 15 and the supplier’s transaction cost for any executed trade is
c0 = 15. The two treatments differ, however, in the variables that affect retailers’payoffs.
In Treatment L, the retailer’s transaction cost for any positive purchase is cr = 29 and
the vector of consumer market prices is (72, 71, 35, 34, 27, 22), where coordinate k denotes
the price if k units are sold in the market, for any number of units k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. In
Treatment H, the retailer’s transaction cost for any positive purchase is cr = 33, and the
vector of consumer market prices is (120, 105, 59, 45, 27, 18).
In Treatment L with parameter values θL, the size of the set of beliefs that support
action profile L in equilibrium is 0.81, and the size of the set of beliefs that support H is
0.10. In Treatment H with parameter values θH , this size is 0.16 for action profile L and
0.93 for action profile H.
We made an affi ne transformation to the payoff function, which has no strategic conse-
quences, but yields two advantages for experimental purposes: we avoid negative payoffs to
subjects by adding a constant, and we equalize supplier and retailers’expected payoffs by
multiplying the supplier’s payoffs by 4/3. Tables 1 and 2 respectively summarize retailers’
payoffs and supplier’s payoffs.
Appendix A3. Alternative Selection Criteria
For completeness, we have also considered a number of other refinements that, to our
knowledge, have not been previously used in our application of interest, but are prominent
in other game theoretic research. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) propose payoff dominance
and risk-dominance. Payoff dominance selects a Pareto superior equilibrium (one that
yields higher payoffs to every player) over a Pareto inferior one. This criterion may seem
plausible when it is applicable, which is only seldom.20 Risk dominance, extended by
Harsanyi (1995) and Selten (1995) selects the equilibrium that is least risky in the sense
that each player minimizes the potential losses if she cannot anticipate which equilibrium
will be played by other agents. Risk dominance is defined for normal form games and while
it has performed well in laboratory experiments on coordination games (Cabrales, Garcıa-
Fontes and Motta, 2000; Schmidt, Shupp, Walker and Ostrom, 2003), it is not obvious how
to apply the intuition underlying this concept to games with imperfect information in a
compelling manner. Peski (2010) introduces two variations of risk dominance that apply
20Payoff dominance only offers a prediction in one of the four treatments in our experiments, and
when it does, it coincides with our prediction.
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to any finite normal form game, but the intuition behind these two refinements does not
extend well to sequential games and in our application, both refinements deliver an empty
prediction. Forward induction as defined by Govindan and Wilson (2009) is applicable and
makes a non-empty prediction. Alas, this prediction does not solve our multiplicity problem:
all equilibria in the vertical contracting game we study satisfy forward induction.21
Myerson’s (1978) proper equilibrium refinement is the only one of these concepts that
is applicable and offers a sharper prediction in our games, as the next claim shows.
Claim 5 For any θ ∈ Θ, the unique proper equilibrium of the vertical contracting game
with parameter vector θ is such that agents play strategy profile ((pL, pL), (0, 2), (0, 2)).
Proof. For any θ ∈ Θ, the set of pure strategy profiles that are sustained in a Sequential
Equilibrium of game Γθ is {((pL, pL), (0, 2), (0, 2)), ((pH , pH), (1, 2), (1, 2))}. Consider first
the equilibrium ((pH , pH), (1, 2), (1, 2)). A Sequential Equilibrium in which (q1, q2) = (1, 1)
is supported by strategy profile ((pH , pH), (1, 2), (1, 2))} and beliefs such that retailer i ob-
serving pi = pL believes with suffi ciently high probability that p−i = pL and thus expects
q−i = 2. However the deviation (consistent with pi = pL) that provides the highest payoff
to the supplier is such that the supplier is still playing the strategy p−i = pH and therefore
in any proper equilibrium, the retailer should assign a probability which gives a higher
weight (of the order of 1ε for ε > 0 infinitesimally small) to strategies according to which
the deviating proposer plays p−i = pH . However, the best response according to these
beliefs is such that when i observes pi = pL, i should buy three units and not two units as
prescribed by the equilibrium, making the deviation profitable for the supplier. Therefore
this equilibrium strategy profile cannot be supported as a proper equilibrium.
Consider the equilibrium ((pL, pL), (0, 2), (0, 2)).A Sequential Equilibrium in which (q1, q2) =
(2, 2) is supported by strategy profile ((pL, pL), (0, 2), (0, 2))} and beliefs such that retailer i
observing pi = pH believes with suffi ciently high probability that p−i = pL and thus expects
q−i = 2. Since the deviation (consistent with pi = pH) that provides the highest payoff to
the supplier is such that the supplier is still playing the strategy p−i = pL, then this strategy
profile is supported by beliefs that satisfy the ε− proper equilibrium refinement.
Despite the sharper prediction, the predictive power of proper equilibrium is under-
whelming: its predictions coincide with those of selection by wary beliefs, and thus it
underperforms relative to equilibrium selection based on identifying the strategy profile
that can be supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs. Finally, in a more re-
cent research paper, In and Wright (2017) propose a new equilibrium concept to refine the
set of Sequential equilibria in a class of senders-receivers games. They name this concept
“RI-equilibrium.” As shown by In and Wright (2017), Section 5.4., in games of verti-
cal contracting with one proposer and two receivers —such as those in our treatments- the
RI-equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium with wary beliefs and with the proper equilib-
rium. More generally, the RI-equilibria are a superset of the proper equilibria). Therefore,
21A proof of this statement is available in the online appendix.
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Other Retailer’s price
if offered a high price
Treatment L Treatment H
High Low High Low
Other Retailer’s price High 1 2 17 4
if offered a low price Low 15S 30P 20S 7P
Table 5: Joint distribution of beliefs (in absolute numbers). P indicates the prediction by
the passive beliefs and S indicates the prediction by symmetric beliefs.
the RI-equilibrium does not offer as good a prediction as our selection criterion in our
experiment.
Appendix A4. Beliefs
Beliefs are a crucial element of equilibrium selection in the games presented. In order to
assess whether game play was related to participants’beliefs, we elicited beliefs of retailers
in a non-incentivized manner at the end of the experiment.22 Immediately after finishing the
main part of the experiment, subjects completed a questionnaire. The two first questions
related to their beliefs. In particular, we asked the following questions: “Suppose that you
play an additional period as a retailer. If the supplier offers you a low / high price, which
price do you think the supplier will offer to the other retailer?”They could either answer
“Low Price”or “High Price.”
Table 5 shows the joint distributions of beliefs. The matrix shows a substantial difference
between treatments. As indicated in the table, according to the equilibrium with symmetric
beliefs, a retailer i would expect the retailer j to be offered a low price when i is offered a
low price, and a high price when i is offered a high price. In the equilibrium with passive
beliefs, retailers expect the other retailer to be offered a low price regardless of the price
offered to themselves.
Note that in Treatment L, most retailers’beliefs are in line with the beliefs predicted by
passive beliefs although in Treatment H, instead, most retailers’beliefs are in line with the
prediction of symmetric beliefs. These findings reinforce the results shown in the previous
section: a selection criterion that imposes an invariant assumption on beliefs regardless of
the nature of the game is inappropriately restrictive, and a poor fit of the data. Off-path
beliefs depend on the particular game.
22Because eliciting beliefs can produce significant changes to the actions played (Croson, 2000, and
Gächter and Renner, 2010), we elicited them only at the end of the experiment, providing subjects
with instructions about belief elicitation only after the contracting game experiment was over.
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Appendix A5. Instructions for Treatment H
(The instructions for Treatment L were exactly the same except for the payoff matrix for
retailers and the numbers in the explanation of the payoffs’table)
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please read these instructions very
carefully. It is important that you do not talk to other participants during the entire
experiment. In case you do not understand some parts of the experiment, please read
through these instructions again. If you have further questions after hearing the instructions,
please give us a sign by raising your hand out of your cubicle. We will then approach you
in order to answer your questions personally. Please do not ask anything aloud.
During this experiment you will earn money. How much you earn depends partly on
your own decisions, partly on the decisions of other participants, and partly on chance.
Your personal earnings will be paid to you in cash as soon as the experiment is over. Your
payoffs during the experiment will be indicated in talers. At the end of the instructions we
are going to explain you how we are going to transform talers into euros.
After the experiment, we will ask you to complete a short questionnaire, which we need
for the statistical analysis of the experimental data. The data of the questionnaire, as well
as all your decisions during the experiments will be anonymous.
The experiment consists of 50 rounds. The rules are the same for all rounds. At the
beginning of the experiment you will be assigned a role. One third of the participants will be
assigned the role of suppliers and the other two thirds will be assigned the role of retailers.
Given that there are 24 participants in the experiment, 8 participants will be assigned as
suppliers and 16 will be assigned as retailers. Your role will be the same in all rounds.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants will be randomly and anonymously
divided in two sets. Each set will consist of 4 suppliers and 8 retailers. These sets remain
unaltered for the entire experiment. At no point are you told who is in your set. In each
period, participants in each set are randomly matched with other participants of the same
set into a subset, which we call a group. Each group will be composed of one supplier and
two retailers. In a given round you will only interact with the participants in your group
for that round.
Each round will be divided into two stages. In the first stage, the price setting stage,
suppliers will decide the price that they will charge each retailer for their goods. In the
second stage, the quantity setting stage, each retailer will decide the quantity to buy. In
what follows we will explain to you the procedure in each round. Remember that 1) in each
round you will only interact with the participants in your group and 2) in the beginning of
each round you will be rematch to a new group within the same set.
Price Setting Stage. In this stage, only suppliers will have to make a decision. The
supplier of each group will have to decide the price charged to each retailer of his/her
group. Retailers will be called Retailer 1 and Retailer 2. These names will be randomly
assigned each round. Suppliers can charge either a Low Price or a High Price. Therefore,
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the suppliers have four possible decisions:
1. Charge a low price to both retailers.
2. Charge a low price to Retailer 1 and a high price to Retailer 2.
3. Charge a high price to Retailer 1 and a low price to Retailer 2.
4. Charge a high price to both retailers.
Quantity Setting Stage. In the quantity setting stage, only retailers will have to
make a decision. Each retailer will have to decide the quantity to buy from the supplier of
their group.
- If the supplier charged a low price, the retailer can buy either 0, 2 or 3 units.
- If the supplier charged a high price, the retailer can buy either 0 or 1 unit.
When deciding the quantity, retailers will not know the price offered to the other retailer
of the group.
Payoffs for the Supplier. The supplier’s payoff from sales to each of the retailers will
depend on the price charged and on the quantity that the retailer decided to buy. Next
table displays the payoff for each of the possible combinations of prices and quantities.
Quantity Bought by the retailer
0 1 2 3
Low Price 0 − 20 40
High Price 0 28 − −
In other words:
- If the price is Low, your payoff (as a supplier) is
- 0, if the retailer buys 0 units
- 20, if the retailer buys 2 units
- 40, if the retailer buys 3 units
- If the price is Low, your payoff (as a supplier) is
- 0, if the retailer buys 0 units
- 28, if the retailer buys 1 unit
The total payoff of a supplier is equal to the sum of payoffs from sales to each of the
retailers.
Payoffs for the Retailers. The payoff of a retailer depends on the quantity bought
by the retailer and the quantity bought by the other retailer of his group. Your payoff is
summarized in the following table:
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Quantity Bought by
the other retailer
0 1 2 3
0 28 28 28 28
Quantity 1 79 64 18 4
Bought 2 175 83 55 19
by you 3 127 85 31 4
In other words:
- If you buy 0 unit and the other retailer buys 0, 1, 2 or 3 units, your payoff is 28.
- If you buy 1 unit, your payoff is:
- 79, if the other retailer buys 0 units.
- 64, if the other retailer buys 1 unit.
- 18, if the other retailer buys 2 units.
- 4, if the other retailer buys 3 units.
- If you buy 2 units, your payoff is:
- 175, if the other retailer buys 0 units.
- 83, if the other retailer buys 1 unit.
- 55, if the other retailer buys 2 units.
- 19, if the other retailer buys 3 units.
- If you buy 3 units, your payoff is:
- 127, if the other retailer buys 0 units.
- 85, if the other retailer buys 1 unit.
- 31, if the other retailer buys 2 units.
- 4, if the other retailer buys 3 units.
Remember that if you have been offered a high price you can only buy zero or one units,
and that if you have been offered a low price, then you can buy either zero, two or three
units. The same holds for the other retailer.
Information at the end of each Round. At the end of each round, all participants
will receive the following information:
(i) the prices offered to each retailer
(ii) the quantities bought by each retailer
(iii) your payoff
Final Earnings. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select 4
rounds and you will earn the payoffs you obtained in these rounds. Each of the 50 rounds
has the same chance of being selected. The total number of points accumulated in these 5
selected rounds will be transformed into euros by multiplying your earnings in talers by a
conversion rate. For this experiment the conversion rate is 0.075, meaning that 100 talers
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equal 7.5 Euros. Additionally; you will earn a show-up fee of 4.00€. Everyone will be paid
in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned.
Control Questions. Before starting this part, you will have to fill in some control
questions in the computer terminal. Click the button Ok after you have answered a question
to move to the next question. In case you answer wrongly, a message will pop out with the
right answer and you will have to answer it again. Once you and all the other participants
have filled all the questions the experiment will start.
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Online Appendix
Online Appendix to the paper: “Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imper-
fect Information”by J. Eguia, A. Llorente-Saguer, R. Morton, and A. Nicolò, submitted to
Games and Economic Behavior. This version: July 2017.
This file contains an extension of our definition of the size of supporting beliefs to games
with uncountable action spaces, and it notes that both both pure equilibria in the games
in our experiment satisfy a forward induction selection criterion.
Definition in games with uncountable action spaces
Consider a game Γ with one proposer labeled 0 and two receivers labeled 1 and 2. The action
set of the proposer is A0 = [0, 1]2. Let a0 = (a01, a02) ∈ A0 be an arbitrary action taken by
the proposer. A pure strategy s0 for the proposer is to choose an action; the strategy set S0
is the action set A0. The action set of each receiver is a finite set, for simplicity, Ai = {0, 1}.
Let ai ∈ Ai be an arbitrary action. The strategy set Si for each receiver i ∈ {1, 2} is the
set of all functions from [0, 1] to Ai, so that si : [0, 1] −→ Ai is a strategy for i and si(a0i)
is the action taken after observing a0i according to strategy si
Let s ≡ (s0, s1, s2) ∈ S ≡ S0 × S1 × S2 be a strategy profile. Let a ≡ (a0, a1, a2) ∈ A ≡
A0 ×A1 ×A2 = [0, 1]2 × {0, 1}2 be an action profile.
Receiver i forms beliefs wi(a0|a0i) about a0 given a0i.
Assume the two receivers are identical, and consider only symmetric pure equilibria in
which both receivers play the same pure strategy and hold the same beliefs, and in which
the proposer chooses s01 = s02. Assume at least one such equilibrium exists, and our task
is to select among them.
In a pure strategy equilibrium, the proposer chooses a given s∗0. Since there is an un-
countably infinite set of possible deviations, our definition of the size of beliefs for finite
games is not applicable to this game, because the Lebesgue measure is not defined over an
infinite-dimensional set. Our selection approach —to select the action profile that can be
part of some equilibrium for the largest set of off-path beliefs- necessitates a measure over
beliefs applicable to games in which the action space of the proposer is uncountable. We
propose the following.
Let the correspondence Bi : A × [0, 1] ⇒ [0, 1] be such that for any i ∈ {1, 2}, any
a = (a0, a1, a2) ∈ A, and any a′0i ∈ [0, 1]\{a0i}, Bi(a, a′0i) ⊆ [0, 1] is the set of degenerate
beliefs by i after observing a′0i 6= a0i such that there is an equilibrium in which a is played
and i′s belief after observing a′0i is in Bi(a, a
′
0i), and such that Bi(a, a0i) = [0, 1]. Define
B ≡ B1 × B2. For any a′0i ∈ [0, 1]\{a0i}, let Li(a, a′0i) ∈ [0, 1] be the Lebesgue measure of
Bi(a, a
′
0i). For any a
′
0 ∈ A0\{a0}, let L(a, a′0) = L1(a, a′01)× L2(a, a′02), so L(a, a′0) denotes
the size of off-path beliefs by both receivers at a′0 such that a
′
0 is not a profitable deviation
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for the proposer and an equilibrium can be sustained.That is, L is the size of B. Then SSB :
A −→ [0, 1] is the function defined by SSB(a) = inf
a′0∈A0
L(a, a′0) =
(
inf
a′0i∈[0,1]
Li(a, a
′
0i)
)2
.
Definition 3 The size of the set of beliefs that supports a as a equilibrium action profile is
SSB(a) = inf
a′0∈[0,1]2
L(a, a′0).
In a finite game with a small strategy set, we would calculate the Cartesian product
of L(a, a0) over all possible deviations. This is not possible with a continuum of feasible
deviations. We select instead the deviation to which the equilibrium is most fragile: the
one with the smallest set of supporting beliefs, that is, we select arg max
a∈A
SSB(a).
Notice that if the set of equilibrium action profiles is finite, this maximum is well defined.
If it is not finite, it is again well defined if the size of supporting beliefs SSB(a) is upper-
semicontinuous.
Note that we introduce two variations with respect to the finite case:
1. For each possible deviation, we calculate size of beliefs over pure actions, not over
possibly mixed strategies.
2. To aggregate the sizes across all deviations, we use the infimum, rather than the
non-existent Cartesian product. We could -at the cost of prohibitive complication and
substantially dubious assumptions- integrate instead.
This size is well defined for each particular action. We next show that if payoff functions
are continuous, then arg max
a∈A
SSB(a) is non-empty.
Assume that the payoff function ui(a0, a1, a2) is continuous.
Definition 4 A function f is upper semi continuous at x if for every ε > 0, there exists a
neighborhood N(x, ε) such that f(y) ≤ f(x) + ε for any y ∈ N(x, ε).
Definition 5 A correspondence g : X ⇒ Y is upper hemi-continuous at x ∈ X if for any
open set O such that g(x) ⊆ O, there is an open set U such that x ∈ U and for any y ∈ U,
g(y) ⊆ O.
The logic of the following results is as follows: first, we establish that the correspondence
B that maps each action profile a and each deviation a′0 to the set of beliefs at a
′
0 that are
consistent with a as an equilibrium is upper hemi continuous over A×A0. It follows that the
size L of this set of beliefs is upper semicontinuous. Then, the size of the set of beliefs that
supports a as an equilibrium (the infimum of sizes over all deviations from this equilibrium,
over all deviations) is also upper semicontinuous, in which case this size has a maximum
over equilibria.
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Lemma 6 B is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof. Let Nε(x) denote the open neighborhood of size ε around x. By definition, B :
A × [0, 1]2 ⇒ [0, 1] is upper hemi-continuous at (a, a′0) if for any open set O containing
B(a, a′0), there is an open set U containing (a, a
′
0) such that for any (ã, ã
′
0) ∈ U, B(ã, ã′0) ⊆ O.
Suppose B is not upper hemi-continuous. Then there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any
ε > 0, there exists (ã, ã′0) ∈ Nε(a, a′0) and b′ ∈ B(ã, ã′0) such that |b′ − b| > δ for any
b ∈ B. Since the actions of receivers are discrete, (ã, ã′0) ∈ Nε(a, a′0) implies that ai = ãi
for i ∈ {1, 2}. Consider (a, a′0) and belief b′. Note that b′ /∈ B(a, a′0). Thus, there is no
equilibrium in which players play action profile a, and receivers hold degenerate beliefs
b′ = (b′1, b
′
2) ∈ [0, 1]2 at the information sets that follow from a deviation to a′0. It must then
be that the proposer has a strict incentive to deviate to a′0, given what receivers would do
after a′0 given beliefs b
′.
Imagine a two-player simultaneous game G played by the two receivers, in which Nature
moved as proposer choosing a0 in A0 and a0 is observed by both receivers. Let (sG1 , s
G
2 ) be
an equilibrium of this game, where sGi : [0, 1]
2 −→ {0, 1} is the strategy chosen by i as a
function of a0. Given b′ = (b′1, b
′
2), if receiver 1 observes a
′
01, receiver 1 believes to be in a
strategic environment identical to that of playing game G after Nature has moved (a′01, b
′
1);
while if receiver 2 observes a′02, she believes that she is as if playing game G and the Nature
has moved (b′2, a
′
02). Consider all the equilibria to game G. For any x ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [0, 1],
let Zi(x, y) ⊆ {0, 1} be the set of actions by receiver i that are equilibrium actions in game
G after Nature has moved (x, y).
Suppose Z1(a′01, b
′
1) = {â1} and Z2(b′2, a′02) = {â2}. Then, given beliefs b′, if the proposer
deviates to a′0 in game Γ, the receivers play (â1, â2), and the proposer has a strict incentive
to indeed deviate to a′0 and attain the utility u0(a
′
0, â1, â2) > u0(a0, a1, a2). Since payoffs are
continuous, if ε is suffi ciently small and ã′0 ∈ Nε(a′0), Z1(ã′01, b′1) = {â1} and Z2(b′2, ã′02) =
{â2}. Recall that u0 : A −→ R is the payoff function for the proposer. Since u0 is continuous,
if ε is suffi ciently small and (ã, ã′0) ∈ Nε(a, a′0), then u0(a′0, â1, â2) > u0(a0, a1, a2) implies
u0(ã
′
0, â1, â2) > u0(ã0, a1, a2). But then the proposer would deviate from ã0 to ã
′
0 given
beliefs b′ and thus b′ 6∈ B(ã, ã′0), a contradiction.
Suppose Z1(a′01, b
′
1) and/or Z2(b
′
2, a
′
02) are not unique. Since there is no equilibrium
with action profile a and beliefs b′ at a′0, it must be that for any (â1, â2) ∈ Z1(a′01, b′1) ×
Z2(b
′
2, a
′
02), u0(a
′
0, â1, â2) > u0(a0, a1, a2). Since u is continuous, there exists ε > 0 such
that Z1(ã′01, b
′
1) × Z2(b′2, ã′02) ⊆ Z1(a′01, b′1) × Z2(b′2, a′02) for any ã′0 ∈ Nε(a′0), (if an action
is not part of an equilibrium strategy given a′01, it is not part of an equilibrium strategy
given anything suffi ciently close to a′01). Then, by the same argument as in the case in
which Z1(a′01, b
′
1) = {â1} and Z2(b′2, a′02) = {â2}, for any (â1, â2) ∈ Z1(ã′01, b′1)×Z2(b′2, ã′02),
u0(a
′
0, â1, â2) > u0(a0, a1, a2) implies u0(ã
′
0, â1, â2) > u0(ã0, a1, a2) and the proposer has a
strict incentive to deviate from ã0 to ã′0, and then again b
′ 6∈ B(ã, ã′0), a contradiction.
Thus, it cannot be that beliefs b′ at a′0 are incompatible with an equilibrium with action
profile a = (a0, a1, a2), and yet there is an equilibrium with ã = (ã0, a1, a2) and beliefs
44
b′ at ã′0. If beliefs b
′ at ã′0 sustain equilibria with ã0 for ã0 arbitrarily close to a0 and ã
′
0
arbitrarily close to a′0, then it must be that b
′ at a′0 also sustain an equilibrium with a0. In
other words, B must be upper hemi-continuous.
Lemma 7 L : A× [0, 1] −→ [0, 1] is an upper semicontinuous function.
Suppose L is not upper semicontinuous at (x, a0i). Then there exists ε > 0 such that
for any open neighborhood N(x, a0i), there exists (y, a′0i) ∈ N(x, a0i) such that L(y, a′0i) >
L(x, a0i)+ε. Consider a sequence of open neighborhoods Nδt(x, a0i) with δt −→ 0, and a se-
quence of (yt, at0i) such that (y
t, at0it) ∈ Nδt(x, a0i), so L(yt, at0i) > L(x, a0i)+ε for any t ∈ N.
By Lemma 6, if b ∈ B(yt, at0i) for any t, then b ∈ B(y, a0i). Then limt−→∞L(y
t, at0i) = L(x, a0i)
but lim
t−→∞
L(yt, at0i) > L(x, a0i) + ε, a contradiction. Thus L is upper semicontinuous.
Lemma 8 SSB : A −→ [0, 1] is an upper semicontinuous function.
Proof. Suppose SSB is not upper semicontinuous at x ∈ A. Then there exists ε > 0 such
that for any open neighborhood N(x), there exists y ∈ N(x) such that SSB(y) > SSB(x).
Let SSB(x) = a. Then for any γ > 0, there exists a0i(γ) such that L(x, a0i(γ)) < a + γ.
L : A× [0, 1] −→ [0, 1] is an upper semicontinuous function (Lemma 7), and if L is upper
semicontinuous, for any δ > 0, L(y, a0i(γ)) ≤ L(x, a0i(γ)) + δ < a+γ+ δ for any y ∈ Nδ(x).
Then SSB(y) < a + γ + δ. If γ = δ = ε3 , we obtain a contradiction. Thus, SSB must be
upper semi-continuous at x.
Proposition 9 The set {arg max
a∈A
SSB(a)} is not empty and a maximum exists.
Proof. S is a compact set. Since SSB is upper semicontinuous (Lemma 8), it attains a
maximum in a compact set.
Forward Induction
We follow the forward induction concept of Govindan and Wilson (2009).
Definition 6 (G&W 3.2.) The outcome of an equilibrium of a game in extensive form is
the induced probability distribution over the terminal nodes of the game tree.
In our application, there are two pure strategy equilibria and one mixed strategy equilib-
rium, and each of these three have a unique, different, outcome. Equilibrium (HH, (1, 2), (1, 2))
has outcome (HH, 1, 1); equilibrium (LL, (0, 2), (0, 2)) has outcome (LL, 2, 2) and the mixed
strategy equilibrium has a probabilistic outcome.
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Definition 7 (G&W 3.3.) A pure strategy of a player is relevant for a given outcome if
there is a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the strategy at every
information set it does not exclude prescribes an optimal continuation given the player’s
belief there.
In our game, since players only move once, no strategy precludes any information set
in which the player gets to move again, and since each outcome is associated with only one
equilibrium, this definition can be simplified.
Definition 8 A pure strategy of a player is relevant for a given outcome if in the equilibrium
with that outcome, the strategy prescribes an optimal continuation given the player’s belief
at the information set in which the player moves.
So in our game, a strategy is relevant if it is a best response given beliefs at each
information set.
For the equilibrium (HH, (1, 2), (1, 2)), the relevant strategies are: HH for the producer,
and (1, 2) for each retailer. For the equilibrium (LL, (0, 2), (0, 2)), the relevant strategies
are: LL for the producer, and (0, 2) for each retailer.
Definition 9 (G&W 3.4.) An information set is relevant for an outcome if it is not ex-
cluded by every profile of relevant strategies.
Relevant information sets for the outcome (HH, 1, 1) are the initial one, and the ones
following HH. Relevant information sets for (LL, 2, 2) are the initial one, and the ones
following LL
Definition 10 (G&W 3.5.) An outcome satisfies forward induction if it results from a
weakly sequential equilibrium in which at every relevant information set the support of the
belief of the player acting there is confined to profiles of nature’s strategies and other players’
relevant strategies.
There is no Nature in our game. And there is only one equilibrium per outcome. So in
our game we can apply a simplified definition.
Definition 11 An outcome satisfies forward induction if in the equilibrium that generates
it, at every relevant information set the support of the belief of the player acting there is
confined to other players’relevant strategies.
For the equilibrium with strategy profile (HH, (1, 2), (1, 2)), this means that retailers
(correctly) believe that other retailers are playing strategy (1, 2). In this equilibrium, retail-
ers do indeed hold such beliefs.
For the equilibrium (LL, (0, 2), (0, 2)), forward induction requires retailers to believe
that the other retailer plays (0, 2), which they do.
So in our application, forward induction does not sharpen the prediction.
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